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Abstract. Ad hoc networks are formed opportunistically as mobile devices come
within wireless communication range of each other. Since individual devices are typi-
cally subject to severe resource limitations, it is both possible and desirable for a device
to enhance its functionality by taking advantage (in a cooperative manner) of capabil-
ities available on other devices. Service provision refers to the process by which devices
advertise their willingness to offer specific services and discover other of services. This
paper describes a service provision model designed specifically for use in ad hoc set-
tings. Security policies governing service accessibility can be specified at application
level while secure communication among devices is ensured by the implementation.
1 Introduction
Advances in portable computing and wireless technology are opening up exciting
possibilities for the future of mobile networking. The opportunity for applica-
tions to exploit an ever-increasing range of resources is expanding rapidly. Any
application or device can advertise and provide services, turning the network
into a global service repository. As portable devices become cheaper and more
powerful, the number of such services is expected to grow significantly in the
coming years. In part, this is because devices having limited capabilities exhibit
a growing dependence on services provided by others. The ability to offer highly
specialized capabilities by means of devices directly connected to the network
turns such devices into service providers. In such an environment the interest
in and reliance upon particular services changes over time. Expressive and de-
pendable means are required to support service discovery. Such environments
demand the ability to obtain support for the task at hand only when needed.
Traditionally, a host sought help from another by means of client-server inter-
actions. It is customary to assume that the client knows the address of the server
that supports the service it needs, has the code necessary to access the server,
and knows the communication protocol the server expects. While this type of
interaction between remote components still dominates distributed computing,
new strategies have emerged to allow servers to advertise services, and clients to
lookup and access them without explicit knowledge of the network structure and
communication details. These discovery-based techniques are growing in impor-
tance, as services become ubiquitous. The high level of abstraction characterizing
these techniques frees the client from handling the communication protocol.
To accomplish this, services may be discovered at runtime and may be ac-
cessed through customized proxies. A proxy abstracts away the network from
the client by offering a high-level interface, specialized for service exploitation
while hiding the proxy’s interface to the server. Services are advertised by pub-
lishing a profile containing attributes and capabilities useful when searching for
a service, and for proper service invocation. Clients search for services using tem-
plates generated according to their momentary needs. These templates must be
matched by the advertised profiles. Services use a service registry to advertise
their availability and clients use the same registry to search for services they
need. This approach offers an unprecedented degree of run-time flexibility.
Mobile ad hoc networks are opportunistically formed structures that change
in response to the movement of physically mobile hosts running potentially mo-
bile code. New wireless technologies allow devices to freely join and leave net-
works, form communities, and exchange data and services at will, without the
need for any infrastructure setup and system administration.
A major challenge in ad hoc networking is frequent disconnections of hosts
which, inherent in ad hoc networks, often lead to inconsistency of data in cen-
tralized service registries. Since this may affect the structure of the network and
the availability of services, this paper aims to provide a service registry that
guarantees the consistency of its content, i.e., one that updates the information
about the service availability atomically with respect to configuration changes.
Architectures based on centralized lookup directories are no longer suitable.
Mobile ad hoc computing cannot rely on any fixed infrastructure. The inter-
actions among devices are peer-to-peer, and entail no external infrastructure
support. Since nodes are mobile, the network topology may change rapidly and
unpredictably over time. The network is decentralized and all activities, includ-
ing topology discovery and message delivery must be carried out by the nodes
themselves. The network structure at any moment depends on the available di-
rect connectivity between mobile devices (unless ad hoc routing is used and thus
having nodes route packets for nodes that cannot reach each other directly).
As flexibility and ease of access to resources increases, so do the possibilities
to tamper with various parts of a distributed application. This represents yet
another major challenge to service provision in ad hoc settings. In open systems,
where the network access is not controlled at the physical level, there’s a spe-
cial need for security mechanisms that facilitate safe interactions among remote
components of a distributed application as well as guarantees about the identity
of processes that offer or use resources over the network. The advertisement of
a service must be protected from unauthorized removal, replacement, or use.
The goal of this paper is to extend the applicability of these kinds of tech-
niques to ad hoc mobility. The reminder of the paper is organized as follows:
Section 2 introduces the service model, security mechanisms, and the challenges
of an ad hoc networking environment. Section 3 presents our model for secure
service discovery. Section 4 describes the implementation of the model. Section
5 presents a test application developed using the discovery model adapted to
ad hoc networks and the security features offered in this environment. Section 6
presents related work on service discovery and security in distributed systems.
Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Secure Service Provision
The service model is composed of three components: services, clients and a dis-
covery technology. Services provide functionality to clients. Clients use services.
The registration feature enables services to publish their capabilities and clients
to find and use needed services. As a result of a successful lookup, a client may
receive a piece of code that actually implements the service or facilitates the
communication to the server offering the service. Part of the quality of a service
being offered by a server is the security guarantees the server offers to a poten-
tial client. Among them is the guarantee that the service cannot be faked by an
intruder and that the usage of the service is safe for the client (e.g., it does not
reveal personal information about the client to the external world).
In a stationary setting, where all hosts access a wired (and therefore reliable)
network, a server can be set up to run the service repository. All service providers
can advertise their offers on this server and clients can connect to this server to
search for the services they need. Security issues are easy to deal with since the
applications can rely on central databases containing information about users,
passwords, credentials and capabilities. Trust management in a distributed sys-
tem operating in a stationary setting is easier when applications can always rely
on the presence of a (server) service ready to authenticate offers and requests.
In the ad hoc network case, both the discovery techniques and security consid-
erations face new challenges. A simple transition of old software to new settings
does not suffice. Service discovery protocols that rely on centralized service reg-
istries are prone to malfunctions, as described in Figure 1a: if the node hosting
the service registry suddenly becomes unavailable, the entire advertising and
lookup of services becomes paralyzed even if the nodes representing a service
and a potential client remain connected. The goal is to make these two nodes
communicate in a peer to peer fashion. Furthermore, because of frequent discon-
nections, the service registry should reflect changes affecting service availability
in a timely fashion. Services that are no longer reachable should not be available
for discovery. In Figure 1b we present a scenario that can happen in Jini [1, 2],
where the advertisement of a service is still available in the lookup table until
its lease expires, even though the provider of the service is no longer reachable.
From the security point of view, in the ad hoc network case, when two devices
come in contact, identifying the other party is not as easy as asking a trusted
third party to verify the other’s identity. While an authentication server may be
available from time to time, the design of the applications should not rely on
this for their proper functioning. There is no guarantee that an authentication
service is available at a given point in time, nor that it will become available
any time soon, and the two nodes will need to take steps to protect themselves.
This leads to special safety measures that have to be taken both by clients and
servers to ensure proper secure interaction in the ad hoc setting.
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Fig. 1. Ad hoc environment challenges. (a) The client could use the service but cannot
discover it. (b) The client discovers a service that is no longer reachable.
A new design solution is needed, one suited specifically for ad hoc networks.
In a model addressing these issues, all nodes should be simple users or providers
of services. The system should not depend on the behavior of a single node for
service discovery or secure interactions. The new challenge is to permit users and
programs to be as effective as possible in this environment of uncertain connectiv-
ity, without changing their manner of operation (i.e., by preserving the semantics
of interaction), and still offer security guarantees. The advertising and lookup
of services in this setting need a lightweight model that supports direct commu-
nication and offers a higher degree of decoupling. A consistent, distributed, and
simple implementation of the service registry is the key to the solution, along
with a simple approach to trust management. Security enforcement is needed
to protect the easily accessible service registries from tampering or unautho-
rized usage and the new model should address this issue to the maximum extent
possible under the additional constraints imposed by ad hoc networking.
3 Secure Service Provision in Ad Hoc Settings
The new model, inspired by the service provision ideas described above, seeks to
address challenges raised by the ad hoc environment while offering a reasonable
level of security. Active entities are logically separated into service providers
(servers) and service users (clients). Both clients and servers may be mobile
agents able to migrate among reachable hosts. Hosts themselves are physically
mobile and form ad hoc networks as connections are established and break down.
A service is the functionality offered by a program or a hardware device to
other programs or hardware devices that need it at run time. In our model,
the interface to the service is provided by a software object (proxy), that can
be transferred over a network locally to the user of the service. This proxy will
represent the service locally to the client. This distinguishes the approach from
techniques where a client is expected to know a priori how to contact a specific
server (i.e., its IP address and port number) and was expected also to handle all
the communication details (i.e., the client was responsible for managing the com-
munication protocol used by each server). The communication details between
the proxy and the implementation of the service (i.e., the protocol being used,
the handling of disconnections while work is in progress) are outside the client’s
area of concern. In some cases, the proxy can implement the entire service itself.
A service provider is any host that offers services to the network. Such a
server registers (advertises) a service by publishing a profile that contains the
capabilities of the service and attributes describing these capabilities, so as to
allow clients to discover and use the services properly. Along with the profile, the
server provides the service proxy. The server has the possibility to deregister a
service previously advertised. This does not necessarily involve the termination
of the service. Clients that are in process of using the service may be allowed to
terminate their jobs in progress, depending on the implementation of the service.
A client searches for services using a template that defines what the needed
service should do. The template contains attributes to request a certain level of
quality. If a service profile satisfying all client’s requirements is available (i.e.,
the advertised profile of the service is a superset of the client’s template and the
attributes advertised by the server meet the client’s criteria), the service proxy,
which is part of service’s profile, is returned to the client. This proxy handles
the communication with the server offering the service. Location information
can be considered a special attribute of the service’s advertisement (if specified
by server) but it is not required in order to discover the service requested by
the client, i.e., the client does not need to know where the implementation of a
service is running in order to discover the service, but can use the information as
part of the quality of service evaluation. This information can map to a physical
location (e.g., for a printer it is more important where it is physically located
than what IP address it has) or to a logical location (e.g., for encryption services
the client may care if the server is within its domain).
The registration, deregistration, and lookup processes take place in service
registries. Service registries are identified by name. They are local to each agent
(client or server) and are shared among agents that created service registries with
the same name, when the hosts they are running on are connected, or they run on
the same host. Service registries shared by different agents under the same name
form a single, federated service registry. After sharing its local service registry,
each agent accesses the federated service registry as if it were local. The transient
sharing of the service registries makes the update of their content transparent
to disconnection and always consistent with respect to connectivity (Figure 2).
Service availability is always consistent with advertisement availability and is
based on direct connectivity between the client’s and the server’s hosts.
The model supports
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Fig. 2. Federated service registry access.
multiple servers (each
server can offer multiple
services), multiple clients,
and multiple service reg-
istries. Clients and servers
can interact via a service
registry if they both have
a local service registry
with the same name. The
model supports code and
host mobility. This means
the hosts can move in
physical space and the
clients and the servers can
represent mobile code able
to migrate anywhere in
the network. Upon migra-
tion of a client or server
the local service registries
will migrate with them
and will be re-shared from
the new location. The
availability of services is
consistently taken care
of by the nature of the
service registries. Any
connection and disconnec-
tion is atomically reflected
in the visible content of the federated service registry. While the migration is
in progress, the migrating agent is temporarily unavailable to the community.
Once at destination, the agent will restart execution. Migration may not always
be possible (e.g., if the service needs a piece of hardware on the host where
it is currently running), may be restricted to a subset of the connected hosts
(those that have the hardware needed by a service), or may not be restricted
at all. A client’s migration may be restricted by the type of services it is using
at the moment of migration. Those services may support resuming from the
new location or may have to be restarted. The programmer of a service has
to take all these details into consideration. The designer of the proxy-server
communication protocol may have to take into account possible disconnections
(due to physical movement, logical migration, or communication failures).
In our model, a default public service registry, created by the system, can
be used to advertise and lookup services. Any server can create a new service
registry. Any service registry, except for the default, can be password protected.
The password is used to encrypt the clear name so that it won’t be accessible
except to those who can generate the same encrypted name from the correct
clear name and the correct password. If a password is associated with a service
registry, that password will secure all the transfers between remote hosts, associ-
ated with that service registry (i.e., any message carrying a query or the result of
a query will be encrypted with the password that protects the registry the query
is executed on). The use of different names and passwords enables creation of
multiple (protected and/or unprotected) administrative domains where servers
can publish services and clients can look them up, grouped by common interest
or access rights. The same applies to clients (i.e., the clients also create a ser-
vice registry locally for search purposes; a search operation will span all service
registries with the same name, local to servers within communication range).
Given the variety of data present in such a repository and the multitude of
users accessing it at one moment, often, the protection has to be extended to
a finer grained level than the entire registry itself. The ad for a service can be
marked read-only by its provider protecting it with a remove-password. This will
prevent unauthorized (accidental or fraudulent) removal of the service ad as well
as the replacement of the ad with a fake one. Additionally, each ad can be pro-
tected by a read-password, different from the password that protects the entire
registry. This will enable a service provider to protect its service individually
among the other services available in the service registry at some moment.
The peer-to-peer interactions supported by the system eliminate single points
of failure scenarios. By simply disconnecting from a party (e.g., a printer), the
stability of a system (e.g., a PDA) is not affected. Neither are the interactions
with other devices (e.g., other PDAs from some conference room that have a
wider communication range than the printer). Services are discovered depending
exclusively on direct connectivity between the two devices (the producer and the
consumer). The messages will continue to flow completely independent of the
location where the agents execute. Explicit use of a raw socket communication
protocol would make this much more difficult.
4 Implementation
The implementation of the new model is based on Lime [3], an adaptation of
the Linda [4] coordination model to ad hoc networking settings. Lime’s tran-
sient tuple space sharing together with the security features newly added to the
original model provide a natural starting point for our implementation.
4.1 Implementation Infrastructure: Lime
The Lime middleware supports the development of applications exhibiting phys-
ical mobility of hosts and logical mobility of agents. An agent is the basic building
block for the mobile application, a software component that may reside perma-
nently on a host or may move from one host to another connected host, hence
the name agent. Hosts serve as containers for the agents and run local versions
of Lime. As suggested earlier, Lime extends the coordination model of Linda
in significant ways. First, the globally accessed persistent tuple space of Linda
is replaced in Lime by transient sharing of identically named tuple spaces be-
longing to agents that are part of the same group, i.e., reside on hosts that are
mutually accessible over the ad hoc network. Other Lime extensions to Linda
include location specific operations, transparent tuple migration, and the ability
to react to the presence of tuples in tuple spaces.
Transparent Context Maintenance. The model underlying Lime accom-
plishes the shift from a fixed global context to a dynamically changing one by
distributing the single Linda tuple space across multiple tuple spaces, each lo-
cal to an agent, and by introducing rules for transient sharing of the individual
tuple spaces based on naming and connectivity; Lime allows an agent to struc-
ture its holdings across multiple tuple spaces each being shared only with other
identically named tuple spaces local to other agents within the group. Group
membership is controlled by connectivity among hosts. Sharing of multiple tu-
ple spaces results in the formation of a virtual global data structure called a
federated tuple space. The content of a federated tuple space is the union of the
contents of the contributing tuple spaces. Access to the federated tuple space is
accomplished by simply accessing the API for the local tuple space.
Basic access to the tuple space takes place using traditional Linda primitives
(e.g., in, rd, out). out takes a tuple t and places it into a tuple space; in takes
as parameter a template p and blocks until a tuple matching the template is
written to the tuple space at which point in removes the tuple and returns a
copy; rd is similar to in but does not remove the tuple. Details of the matching
mechanism will be explained later. Lime offers also non-blocking versions of in
and rd in the form of probe variants of the same operations (e.g., inp, rdp). In
general, non-blocking operations return a matching tuple (if one is available) and
null otherwise. Both blocking and non-blocking extensions designed to handle
entire groups of tuples matching the same template are also included in Lime.
A tuple is an ordered list of fields. Each field has a type and a value. A
template is an ordered list of fields that can contain type designators (formal
fields) or explicit values (actual fields). A tuple and a template match if both
contain the same number of fields and each corresponding pair of fields matches.
Initially, two field-level matching policies were available: (1) Exact type match-
ing: the field in the template is a formal and its type is the same as the type
of the object in the corresponding tuple field. (2) Exact value match: the tem-
plate field provides an actual that will match exactly the type and the value of
the corresponding field in the tuple. We’ve added a third one: (3) Polymorphic
matching: the field in the template can be a formal whose type is a supertype of
the corresponding object in the tuple; this yields the highest degree of flexibility,
since the Java Object class (or the Java Serializable interface for objects that
travel across the network) works as a wildcard. We also added the possibility for
a tuple to specify which type of matching is to be used for each field (e.g., the
tuple may require the template to provide the exact value for the first field).
Controlling Context Awareness. A read-only tuple space called the
LimeSystemTupleSpace provides an agent with a view of the overall system
configuration. Its tuples contain information about the mobile agents present
in the community, physical hosts they execute on, and tuple spaces created for
coordination. Standard tuple space operations on LimeSystemTupleSpace allow
an agent to respond to the arrival and departure of other agents and hosts. Fur-
thermore, Lime provides fine-grained control over the context on which an agent
chooses to operate by extending its operations with tuple location parameters
that define projections of the federated tuple space.
Reacting to Changes in Context. Lime extends the basic Linda tuple
space with the notion of reaction. A reactionR(s, p) is defined by a code fragment
s that specifies the actions to be executed when a tuple matching the template
p is found in the tuple space. Blocking operations are not allowed in s, as they
could prevent the program from ever terminating.
In Lime, reactions come in two forms: strong reactions and weak reactions.
Strong reactions execute atomically with the writing of the tuple that enables
them. They must be restricted to a host or agent because the requirements of
atomicity would entail a distributed transaction encompassing multiple hosts
for every tuple space operation. Lime also provides the notion of weak reaction.
The difference is that the execution of s does not happen atomically with the
detection of a tuple matching p, but it is guaranteed to take place eventually if
connectivity is preserved. This eliminates the need for a distributed transaction
and allows this type of reaction to execute over the federated tuple space.
4.2 Security Support Implementation
The security extensions we had to introduce to Lime in order to support secure
service provision and other secure interactions were designed so as to have mini-
mal impact over the programming interface offered to the developer. The exten-
sions take password(s) as extra parameter(s) in the calls that handle protected
targets (i.e., tuples and tuple spaces). The secure inter host communication is
automatically turned on by the usage of secure tuple spaces, therefore it does
not have by itself any impact on the programmer interface.
For encryption we used the 3DES private key encryption algorithm (the keys
are generated internally from the provided passwords). The data being encrypted
represents messages passed between hosts and not data that has to be stored
safely. We also assume that Java language’s protection mechanisms are robust
enough (e.g., a private member of an object cannot be accessed by any other
object). We do not address physical level attacks like wireless signal jamming.
The architecture overview can be observed in Figure 3.
Password Protected Tuple Spaces. The name of the tuple space is the
key to gaining access to the information in that tuple space. To protect the
information means to protect the name of the tuple space. Changes are re-
quired to ensure that extracting the name of a protected tuple space from
LimeSystemTupleSpace will no longer provide enough information for an agent
to create a tuple space with the same name and share it with other agents thus
gaining unauthorized access to information.
The tuple space name (clear
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Fig. 3. Architecture overview.
or encrypted) will be prefixed
by a differentiator: letter “U”
for unencrypted or “S” for se-
cure tuple space. The tuple space
called “blue” is different from
the tuple space called “blue” and
protected with password “pwd”
(the latter will actually have the
internal nameKpwd(blue) ). They
can coexist but no sharing takes
place. The prefixes ensure that
a tuple space cannot be created
incorrectly. Since they are internally added, they cannot be manipulated by
agents. This will prevent an attacker from successfully creating a protected tu-
ple space after inspecting the content of LimeSystemTupleSpace.
The constructor call (Figure 4) is the only place where the agent explicitly
uses the password. Once the agent has the handle to the tuple space, it does
not need the password anymore. A tuple space operation can only be called by
the Lime agent that created it. Even if the handle of a tuple space is obtained
correctly by an agent, it cannot be transferred and used by another agent. Tuple
space password is not needed for tuple space access operations.
The encrypted name of a protected tuple space and the password that pro-
tects it are also important for inter-host communication. This is why the Lime
server has a SecurityTable that stores entries of the form [encrypted name,
password]. This SecurityTable is a very important target that has to be pro-
tected. Since this paper does not address the Java security model, we assume
this model is secure enough for our research.
SecureLimeTupleSpace(java.lang.String name, java.lang.String password)
— creates a new secure tuple space using the public tuple space name and the
password. This call places an entry in the SecurityTable mapping the encrypted
name to the password.
Fig. 4. The call that creates a secure tuple space
Tuple Level Protection. To implement password-protected tuples, every
tuple space operation will add to the end of the user specified fields (if any) three
fields: the read-password, the remove-password and the name of the operation
that uses that tuple or template (e.g., ”rd” for any type of read operation or
reaction, ”in” for any type of remove operation - these two apply to templates -
and ”out” for any type of write operation - this will differentiate the tuple from
templates, since they both are instances of the same Tuple class). The fields
containing passwords are subject to exact value matching policy. These fields
are not explicitly available to the programmer for direct manipulation but used
by the methods the programmer calls to manipulate the tuples.
The tuples’ content is not encrypted. The access control is realized by filtering
the tuples based on the three security fields. The filtering happens during the
matching process between the template used by an operation that tries to access
a tuple in the tuple space and the tuple(s) already in the tuple space. It is
important to note that the matching of the three fields recently added to the
end of the tuples/templates is slightly altered to accommodate common sense
scenarios like: the tuple has both a read-password and a remove-password and
the template provided by a read operation has the remove-password and not the
read-password. We consider it is normal for this operation to succeed because if
someone has the password to remove a tuple, he/she should also be able to read
the tuple (note that removing a tuple returns the tuple to the process and doesn’t
just erase it from the tuple space, therefore this will not produce a security
breach). Another example is the case when a tuple has a read-password but no
remove-password. A remove kind of tuple space operation will need to provide
the tuple’s read-password as the template’s remove-password for the operation
to succeed. The reason is that if the user needs a password only to read the
tuple, he/she will need a password to remove the tuple and therefore the read-
password will protect the tuple from removal. If the tuple has a different, non
null remove-password, the mechanism described above does not work anymore.
lts.out(ITuple tuple, char[] readPwd, char[] removePwd)
— writes a tuple to the tuple space and protects it against reading and/or removing.
Any combination of the two passwords is permitted.
lts.rd(ITuple template, char[] readPwd)
— reads a tuple from the tuple space if the tuple and the template match
(and the correct password is provided).
lts.in(ITuple template, char[] removePwd)
— removes a tuple from the tuple space if the tuple and the template match
(and the correct password is provided).
Fig. 5. The tuple space interaction operations.
Communication Level Protection. When an agent executes an opera-
tion that spans beyond the limits of the current host, an interceptor catches it,
analyzes the tuple space that the message refers to (the name of the tuple space
is always present in the message that travels across hosts) and takes the appro-
priate action. The use of the interceptor pattern [5] is natural for this case, when
we add security to a system that in its initial design did not address this issue.
It also offers great flexibility with respect to the choice of encryption protocol.
The interceptor checks whether the tuple space name in the outgoing message
is in the SecurityTable. If the message refers to an unprotected tuple space,
the interceptor lets it pass through unchanged. If the tuple space is a secure one,
the interceptor will extract from the table the password that corresponds to
that tuple space and will use it to encrypt the message. The interceptor creates
a packet that contains the encrypted message and the encrypted name of the
tuple space the message refers to and forwards this packet to the other involved
host. On the recipient’s side, actions happen symmetrically. The returned results
are handled similarly.
Note that using protected tuples in unprotected tuple spaces leads to these
tuples/templates being shipped between hosts unencrypted and thus vulnerable
to eavesdropping. Once an attacker captures a packet and extracts the passwords
clearly written in the tuple, he will be able to remove these tuples. Unprotected
tuple spaces do not provide any security guarantees for protected tuples when
communication across hosts is involved.
4.3 Service Model Implementation
The implementation consists of a new Lime agent class, ServiceAwareAgent.
This is because Lime restricts the tuple space access to a Lime agent, the one
that created it. The programmer will need to extend the ServiceAwareAgent
class and implement its run()method. The new agent will inherit from ServiceAwareAgent
the functionality it needs to manipulate service ads (Figure 6).
public ServiceAwareAgent()
— creates a new ServiceAwareAgent.
public abstract void run()
— abstract method that defines the agent’s behavior and has to be
implemented by the programmer in the class that extends ServiceAwareAgent.
public String[] listPublicRegistries()
— returns the list of the names of all public registries currently available.
public ServiceRegistry createServiceRegistry(String name, char[] pwd)
— creates a new service registry protected with password pwd, if specified. If pwd
is null the service registry will be unprotected.
public ServiceID registerService(ServiceRegistry sr, ServiceID sid,
Serializable proxy, Profile prof, char[] upwd, char[] rpwd)
— registers a new service in the specified service registry.
public void deregisterService(ServiceRegistry sr, ServiceID sid, char[] pwd)
— deregisters the service identified by ‘sid’, if all conditions are met.
public Service findService(ServiceRegistry sr, ServiceID sid,
Profile prof, char[] pwd)
— searches for a service that corresponds to the description.
Fig. 6. ServiceAwareAgent’s public interface.
A service repository is created around a Lime tuple space, with or without a
password (which makes it be public or protected). Each client/server can create
multiple service registries and will receive a handle to each of them. The handle
will be used when registering, deregistering of searching for services.
A service is advertised as a tuple in the specified service registry (or in the
default public service registry) together with a profile (the Profile class is a
container for pairs [interface, attributes], where the attributes describe the asso-
ciated interface which the service implements). When the service is advertised,
it will be assigned by the system a unique service identifier (sid), if not specified
by the server (i.e., it is advertised for the first time). This sid will be used for
removing the advertisement when no longer needed.
When searching for a service, a client can specify the sid if it had previously
used the service. This is the easiest way to rediscover a service. If the client does
not have the sid for the needed service or if the service identified by the sid
the client has is not available, the search has to be performed using the service
description. The client will provide a profile of the service it needs. The tuple
matching mechanism will return tuples that represent services whose profile is a
super set of the profile requested by the client (i.e., implement all the interfaces
the client requested and the values of the advertised attributes match the values
requested by the client). The result is a wrapper (the Service class) which con-
tains the proxy object and the sid of the service. The security requirements must
be met in both cases (i.e., when using a sid and when using the entire profile).
Service deregistration translates to removing the tuple carrying the service
advertisement from the corresponding service registry, i.e., the corresponding
tuple space. The agent trying to deregister the service must have the service’s
sid and password (if applicable). The passwords that protect a service translate
to read-password and remove-password in from Lime secure tuple space access.
5 Sample Application
The framework presented in this paper was first evaluated in a test application
(Figure 7) that allows a car driving down a highway to make an electronic
payment to an approaching tollbooth. As the car approaches and discovers the
tollbooth, and receives the proxy object for the payment service, the list of prices,
pays by credit card and continues its trip without stopping. At the highway exit,
the proxy completes the payment to the tollbooth at the highway exit. Meanwhile
the proxy obtained from the car the distance they travelled (also computable
from the two tollbooths positions), the type of car (sedans, SUVs and trucks
have different prices), and driver’s credit card number from his/her PDA.
The car has an agent specialized in automatic payments (toll roads, parking,
etc.). All these charge points are configured to establish contact with vehicle
agents in a predefined, unprotected tuple space, called ”payments”. The agent
in the car is continuously looking for payment services. Near the tollbooth, the
car discovers the payment service, retrieves the proxy object and ”launches” the
service, displaying the proxy’s GUI on the car’s screen.
The tollbooth advertises the service in a read-only tuple. However an attacker
can be nearby and advertise in a read-only tuple, in the same ”payments” tuple
space, another proxy object that claims to handle the toll payment. The car
agent has to decide now which of the two services to use. One possibility is for
the car to specifically read the service from tollbooth’s local tuple space. This
implies that the car agent knows how to use location parameters to limit the
service query to the tollbooth part of the tuple space. While this is doable for
the daily drive from home to office and back (assuming the same route), on
a long journey this can get complicated. The configuration time can be much
longer than a regular cash payment. In this second case, once the proxy object is
”launched” on the car’s computer, it can connect to the tollbooth and light up a
flash light to indicate it can communicate with the tollbooth. A proxy retrieved
from an attacker will not be able to interact with the tollbooth. Short range
wireless communication is another trick that can help at the physical level.
Since the car can read the
Fig. 7. Automatic toll payment is one of the fea-
tures offered by a wireless dashboard application.
tuple from the tollbooth, the
vulnerability is to read a tu-
ple put there by an attacker.
The car agent will have to ver-
ify that the tuple is read-only
(i.e., by failing in an attempt
to remove it). The reader is re-
minded that the read-only tu-
ple could not have been placed
there by anybody else since
they cannot migrate.
While on the highway on the
way to the exit point, the ser-
vice’s GUI display’s the price
for the current type of car and
the list of credit cards the proxy
retrieved from the driver’s PDA
(or from the software running on car’s computer). The driver can choose which
one to use and this completes the interaction with the toll proxy. Note that for
the daily route from home to the office (for example), most of the actions can be
automated. The driver could be prompted only if there’s a change in the price.
The driver can designate a default credit card for this type of payments, etc.
When leaving the highway, the proxy displays the distance driven and the
price, and sends the payment information to the tollbooth, issues an electronic
receipt and then terminates execution. The proxy-tollbooth interaction is carried
out via a protected tuple space and then using a private, raw socket protocol.
6 Related Work
The discovery technique constitutes the main difference among various existing
implementations of the service discovery model. Sun Microsystems developed
Jini [1, 2] that uses as a service registry lookup tables managed by special services
called lookup services. These tables may contain executable code in addition to
information describing the service. A Jini community cannot work without at
least one lookup service. IETF offers the Service Location Protocol [6] where di-
rectory agents implement the service registry. They store service profiles and the
location of the service but no code. The discovery of services involves first locat-
ing these directory agents. If no directory agent is available, clients may multicast
requests for services and servers may multicast advertisements of their services.
The most common service types use, by default, the service templates standard-
ized by Internet Assigned Numbering Authority (IANA). Microsoft proposed
Universal Plug’n’Play [7], which uses the Simple Service Discovery Protocol [8].
This protocol also uses centralized directory services for registration and lookup.
If no such proxy is available, SSDP uses multicast to announce new services or
to ask for services. The advertisement contains a Universal Resource Identifier
(URI) that leads to an XML description of the service. This description is acces-
sible only after the service has been already discovered through a lookup service.
The novelty of this model is the auto configuration capability based on DHCP
or AutoIP. The Salutation project [9] also uses a relatively centralized service
registry called Salutation Manager (SLM). There may be several such managers
available, but the clients and servers can establish contact only via these SLMs.
The advantage of this approach is the fact that these SLMs can have different
transport protocols underneath, unlike the above-mentioned models that all as-
sume an IP transport layer. To realize this, Salutation uses transport-dependent
modules, called Transport Managers that broadcast internally, helping SLMs
from different transport media interact with each other. In [10], the authors ad-
dress the nomadic computing case from the point of view of the flexibility of the
service advertisement and lookup matching.
Security issues are addressed in [11] which discusses threats and protection
mechanisms for distributed systems. A capability-based security system is pre-
sented in [12]. The authentication mechanism is similar to ours, in that the capa-
bilities can be verified locally, as opposed to an access control list approach where
a central server is needed (like, for example, in Lampson’s access matrix[13]).
In[14] the authors describe an infrastructure for secure service discovery which
offers privacy and authentication at the expense of a loaded infrastructure and
centralized architecture allowing single points of failure. [15] addresses proxy-
based security protocols for mobile devices, but also relies on a relatively cen-
tralized architecture for accomplishing some key tasks. Security is accomplished
by adapting SPKI/SDSI [16, 17] for proxy-server and/or proxy-proxy interac-
tions. In [18] the authors use public keys as authentication certificates for Jini
services, manually managed in local databases as initial trust relationships.In
Service Location Protocol, authentication is done using public key encryption
and having trust relationships between directory agents and service agents de-
fined by the network administrator [19].
7 Conclusions
In this paper we presented a technique that allows for consistent service adver-
tisement and discovery in ad hoc networks by service registry updates atomic
with respect to changes in service availability due to mobility (and disconnec-
tions as a side effect). The paper also describes some security features that can
provide for safer service advertisement and utilization in ad hoc networks. The
solutions were implemented using the Lime which is specialized for use in both
wired and ad hoc networks.
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